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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 May 1963

SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKING INDIA
THROUGH BURMESE TERRITORY

THE PROBLEM

The object of this study is to estimate Communist China's maximum military capabilities for attacking India through Burmese territory. It does not estimate Chinese intentions nor does it take cognizance of military preparations the Chinese Communists might believe necessary in adjusting to developments in international affairs arising from their violation of Burmese territory. The estimates in this study are based on the following assumptions: (a) the government of Burma would not resist the deployment of Chinese forces across Burmese territory and would acquiesce in the utilization by the Chinese of Burmese transportation facilities and airfields along the path of attack; (b) the Burmese population, economy and military forces would not actively support the Chinese attack; (c) the Chinese would not be required to deploy security troops on airfields and along

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logistic routes within Burma, or divert forces to screen their southern flank; (d) the Chinese would not consider it necessary to augment ground and air forces along China's borders with countries in Southeast Asia; (e) and the government of North Vietnam would make available to the Chinese port and rail facilities in North Vietnam.

CONCLUSIONS

A. In an attack on India through Burma we believe that the Chinese Communists would use Kunming as their base of supply. Kunming is served by a rail line from Hanoi in North Vietnam and by road from the Chinese railhead at Anshun and these facilities would be adequate to support operations that are feasible in the China-Burma-India theater. The Chinese could use two routes to move supplies through Burma: (a) the Ledo Road via Myitkyina and (b) the Burma Road to Mandalay-Imphal highway. (Paras. 1-2)

B. The Chinese could move a total of 640 tons per day to Gauhati and Dibrugarh in India during the dry season. This effort would require about 10,000 trucks, approximately five percent of China's truck park, and, on an annual basis, 150,000 tons of

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motor gasoline, approximately 10 percent of China's total gasoline supply in 1962. We estimate that the Chinese could possibly support simultaneously attacks from Tibet and Sinkiang and through Burma, but only at the price of drastic reductions in motor transport and POL for other military purposes and for civilian uses. The Chinese would also be faced with extremely formidable administrative, maintenance, and repair problems. (Paras. 4-6)

C. We estimate that the maximum ground force the Chinese could deploy in an attack through Burma would be about 85,000 men, composed of approximately six infantry divisions and one artillery regiment under the command of an army headquarters. The most favorable period for operations in the area begins in November. (Paras. 10-12)

D. The Chinese could use two avenues of attack, both of which are extensions of the trans-Burma supply routes described in A. The objective of an attack along the northern route, we believe, would be the destruction of Indian army forces, the seizure of the Digboi oil fields and the eventual link-up with Chinese attacks from Tibet in the eastern part of the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA); this attacking force, we estimate, would consist of two light infantry divisions, one standard infantry

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division and an artillery regiment. The objective of an attack along the southern route would be to seize Gauhati, linking up with forces attacking through Bhutan, thus denying the Indians access to all of Assam east of Gauhati and facilitating the occupation of NEFA; the attacking force, we estimate, would consist of two light infantry divisions and one standard infantry division. (Paras. 13-14)

E. In support of an attack through Burma the Chinese could use 395 tactical aircraft. As the objectives and targets would be the same, we included in the total figure of 395 the 190 aircraft which we estimate the Chinese would use in attacking from Tibet. We estimate that the tactical force would consist of 300 MIG 15/17 jet fighters, 75, IL-28 light jet bombers and 20 TU-2 light piston bombers. We estimate the jet fighters could fly 75 ground and 215 air defense/combat air patrol sorties daily. The jet light bombers could fly an estimated total of 55 sorties per day and the piston light bombers could fly an estimated total of 15 sorties per day. Transport aircraft available for operations in Burma would consist of approximately 120 light and small aircraft. (Paras. 16-21)

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DISCUSSION

I. GROUND OPERATIONS

Logistics

1. The theater of operations for a Chinese Communist offensive against India through Burma encompasses Yunnan Province in China, that part of Burma north of Mandalay, and the states of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur in northeast India. The Chinese would probably locate their base depot at Kunming which is served by road from railheads at Chengtu and Anshun and by rail via Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam.

2. Supplies for Chinese ground forces engaged in operations in India would have to be moved over lines of communications extending some 1100 miles beyond Kunming. The initial transportation leg would cover the route between Kunming and Ipinglang, which are connected by rail, and then by road to Hsinchieh, which is near the Sino-Burmese border some 330 miles west of Kunming. From Hsinchieh the Chinese could move supplies across Burma to the Indo-Burmese border via the following main supply routes: (a) over the Ledo Road via Myitkyina, and (b) over the Burma Road to Mandalay and thence by way of the Mandalay-Imphal highway.

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3. It is estimated that a maximum daily resupply tonnage of 985 tons for ground operations would be required at Ipinglang, and about 400 tons would be required for air operations at Kunming. Although this daily resupply requirement of some 1400 tons would tax the rail line leading into Kunming, it is estimated that rail facilities between Hanoi and Kunming would be adequate for delivery of this tonnage. If necessary, the Chinese could move several hundred tons per day by truck to Kunming from the Anshun railhead.

4. Of the 985 tons delivered by rail to Ipinglang, a total of 640 tons per day could be transported during the dry season to Gauhati and Dibrugarh in India. The remaining 345 tons would consist of gasoline consumed by the motor transport. The maximum of approximately 10,000 trucks, required in these resupply operations would constitute about 10 percent of the Chinese military truck park and about five percent of the national inventory. In addition to the military motor transport, there are an estimated 6,000 trucks in Yunan Province.*

* Although it is assumed that the Chinese would not be afforded the benefits of the Burmese economy, it is of interest to note that there are approximately 13,000 trucks in Burma.

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On an annual basis nearly 150,000 tons of motor gasoline would be required for tactical and resupply operations, about 10 percent of China's 1962 gasoline supply.

5. If the Chinese were to launch attacks into India from Tibet, Sinkiang and Burma, a total of about 50,000 trucks would be required. This would amount to approximately 50 percent of the Chinese military truck part and about 25 percent of the nation's serviceable military and civilian truck inventory. Tactical and logistic support operations during both offensives would require, on an annual basis, about 750,000 tons of motor gasoline, or more than 50 percent of the motor gasoline available in all of China in 1962.

6. Although China could make available the motor transport and gasoline required to support these offensives, to do so would necessitate a drastic reallocation of the nation's transportation and POL resources. Trucks would have to be redistributed from other military regions and the civilian economy would be stripped of all but a minimal level of motor transport. Many organizational and managerial problems would arise, and it is questionable whether the military or civilian transportation agencies could cope with these problems. Furthermore, if this

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transportation effort, which would be taking place over extremely long and difficult roads and in areas far remote from industrial bases, were to continue for long, the Chinese would be confronted by perhaps insurmountable maintenance and repair problems.

Composition of the Attacking Forces

7. We estimate that the composition of the Chinese Communist force could include an army headquarters to provide operational control along the axes of advance, lightly equipped infantry divisions for the assault phase across the mountainous jungle terrain along the Indo-Burmese border, and an operational reserve consisting of standard infantry divisions with their organic medium artillery and tanks, to be employed on the Assam plain in the combat-in-depth-phase.

8. These ground units could be provided by the two armies estimated to be located in the Kunming Military Region, or, if necessary, could be deployed from China's strategic ground reserve. In any case, sufficient numbers of trained and equipped infantry divisions are readily available from China's standing army.

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Operational Considerations

9. Staging of these troops probably would be accomplished within Chinese territory. In order to insure maximum tactical surprise the Chinese probably would transport the force rapidly across Burma, and after the shortest possible delay in attack positions located on the Burma side of the frontier, would launch their division-size attacks into northeast India. Since it is assumed that the Chinese would not have had the opportunity to pre-position military stores within Burma, resupply operations would necessarily be programmed to follow immediately behind the troop convoys.

10. An offensive during the southwest monsoon (May-September) would be extremely difficult, but not impossible, to support logistically. The most favorable period for military operations in the area occurs at the beginning of the dry season in November. Refer to Annex D for a detailed discussion of the climatic effects on ground and air operations.

Avenues of Attack

11. We estimate that the Chinese would utilize two major avenues of advance into northeast India; both are extensions of

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the trans-Burma supply routes and lead from the Indo-Burmese border northward through Ledo and across the Digboi oil fields to Dibrugarh, and westward to Gauhati via Imphal and Kohima.

12. In simultaneous advance over the two selected avenues of attack into India, the Chinese could employ and logistically support a force estimated at 85,000 troops, organized into approximately six infantry divisions and one artillery regiment (army), under the command of an army headquarters. (Tables of personnel and equipment for the army headquarters and for the standard infantry divisions are shown in Annexes B and C, respectively.)

13. Along the northern axis leading to Dibrugarh the Chinese force could consist of major elements of two light infantry divisions, one standard infantry division, and an artillery regiment (army). It is believed that Chinese objectives in this attack would be the destruction of Indian Army Forces, the seizure of the Digboi oil fields, and the eventual link-up with Chinese operations from Tibet into the eastern part of the Northeast Frontier Agency.*

* USIB Memorandum, "Chinese Communist Ground Threat Against India from Tibet and Sinkiang", dated 17 April 1963.

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14. In the advance towards Gauhati the Chinese could employ two light infantry divisions and one standard infantry division. In this attack Chinese objectives would be the destruction of Indian forces and, in conjunction with the Chinese attack from Tibet across Bhutan into the Gauhati area north of the Brahmaputra River, the establishment of a blocking position south of the river. This maneuver would deny the Indians access to all of Assam east of Gauhati and, at the same time, facilitate the occupation of the Northeast Frontier Agency and the important areas of northeast India.

II. AIR OPERATIONS

Tactical

15. There are 19 airfields within China and 12 within northern Burma which could be used for the employment of Chinese Communist air forces (See Annexes E and F). Because of locational factors and logistic restrictions, however, only six of the former and two of the latter have been considered for use by the Chinese. Of the six Chinese fields, four were previously referred to in the

25X1X7 [REDACTED] Estimate of the Communist Chinese Air Threat Against India,
dated 17 January 1963. These are Lhasa, Nagchhu Dzong, Yushu and

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Kunming. Two have been added for purposes of this study -- Mengtzu West and Chengtu/Wenchiang. The Burmese air fields to be utilized are Myitkyina and Namponmao. A program of improving existing forward airfields in Burma and the use of airfields that may be captured in India have been considered and could result in continuing forward deployment of fighter/ground attack aircraft to the immediate vicinity of the active battle area.

16. In a Chinese ground attack against northeast India involving operations from Tibet as well as from Yunnan Province through Burma, a total of 395 tactical aircraft could be employed. Of this figure, 190 have been referred to previously in the US-UK estimate and were divided as follows: 120 MIG 15/7s (FAGOT/FRESCO), 50 IL-28s (BEAGLES), and 20 TU-2s (BATS).^{*} For operations across Burma, an additional 205 aircraft could be deployed including 180 MIG 15/17s and 25 IL-28s. Included within the jet fighter total are 30 MIG-17D limited all-weather aircraft. These would assist

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* The [] estimate was concerned with a Chinese attack from Sinkiang Province and Tibet and 290 aircraft were estimated as constituting the air threat. Of these 290 aircraft 100 were apportioned to Sinkiang airbases for operations against the Ladakh-Jammu-Kashmir area and 190 to operations against the Northeast Frontier Agency and upper Brahmaputra River valley areas of northeastern India. Because operations across Burma would also be directed against northeastern India, these 190 aircraft have been included in this study as well.

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in the air defense of the important military and industrial complexes of Chengtu and Kunming. Locations of all aircraft are identified in Annexes E and F, and logistics requirements for this force are noted in Annex G.

17. Because of range limitations, jets based at Myitkyina and Namponmao would be the only fighter aircraft that could be employed in a ground attack role. From these two bases in Burma, the fighters could provide close support to ground forces generally within an area embracing Imphal, Dibrugarh and Sadiya in India (See Map, Annex -). TU-2 aircraft, in attacks from Nagchhu Dzong airfields in Tibet, could also provide support to ground forces as far south as Imphal. IL-28s would have the range to conduct bombing attacks and reconnaissance over north-east India and jet fighters on combat air patrol could cover all of India east of East Pakistan and Nepal.

18. It is estimated that the Chinese Communist air force can maintain an aircraft-in-commission rate of approximately 60 percent with daily sorties numbering 360. A likely mixture for this number of sorties would be 75 ground support and 215 air defense/combat air patrol sorties by jet fighters with the jet light bombers conducting 55 sorties per day and the piston light bombers conducting 15 sorties per day. The total daily

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tonnage of ordnance on target is estimated as follows:

IL-28s	120
TU-2s	20
<u>MIG 15/17s</u>	<u>57*</u>
TOTAL	197

* Of which 21 tons are bombs and 36 tons are gun ammunition.

Airborne Support

19. We believe that approximately 120 light and small transport aircraft could be utilized in supporting operations through Burma. The 30 IL-12s, 16 IL-14s, and 28 C-46s of the Thirteenth Air Division could support the airfields at Myitkyina and Nampunmao from the Chengtu area as long as airborne operations were not conducted elsewhere. In addition, 7 LI-2s and 3 C-47s of the Thirteenth Air Division could operate from Mandalay and 35 AN-2s could be located in Burma as follows: 10 at Sinkaling Hkani South, 10 at Kolemia and 15 at Katha.

20. The aircraft based in the Chengtu area would be capable of delivering about 132 tons of material daily to the two Burmese airfields. They probably would be used to develop and maintain initial stocks of POL and ammunition. The aircraft probably

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could operate on about 25 percent more flying days than could the fighter aircraft they were supporting. This assistance would be continued until about one week prior to any planned airborne assault at which time the division would undergo a major stand down to prepare aircraft for assault operations.

21. The ten aircraft based at Mandalay would provide support for the AN-2 bases or additional assistance to Myitkying and Namonmao moving forward the 50 tons of material allocated to the air forces at this point. In addition, they could maintain liaison and lift supplies from Kunming airfield if needed. The AN-2s would be committed exclusively to supporting the ground forces. It is believed that these aircraft would be able to maintain an availability rate of about 65 to 70 percent and a sortie rate of two per day. Each aircraft could carry about one ton of cargo for air dropping or 10 paratroops.

22. As concurrent military operations from Tibet and Yunnan Province would so deplete China's total air transport forces, we estimate that replacement aircraft would not be available for any transports lost through combat attrition.

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Annex A

DAILY RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR SELECTED CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY UNITS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>	<u>CLASS II & IV (General Supplies)</u>	<u>CLASS III (POL)</u>	<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>	<u>TOTAL* (All Classes)</u>
Army-Hq (including Command & Staff and Combat Support elements)	5.2	4.7	9.9	0.6	20.4
Arty Regt (Army)	2.1	1.9	7.3	18.7	30.0
Inf Div (Standard)	24.6	22.3	34.9	45.9	127.7
Inf Div (Light)	23.6	21.5	4.8	38.2	88.1

* Short tons based on "average combat rates" at 85% TOE.

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Annex B

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	<u>Total</u>	<u>Cmd Grp & Staff</u>	<u>Arty Regt</u>	<u>Sig Bn</u>	<u>Gd Bn</u>	<u>Rcn Bn</u>	<u>Eng Bn</u>
<u>Personnel:</u>							
Officers	783	403	207	38	54	42	39
Enlisted	4355	1581	1290	257	356	428	443
Total	5138	1984	1497	295	410	470	482
<u>Equipment:</u>							
Gun How, 152 mm	12		12				
Gun, 130/122 mm	12		12				
Mortar, 160 mm	12		12				
LMG, 7.62 mm	72				27	27	18
SMG, 7.62 mm	785	71	203	64	66	339	42
Carbine, 7.62 mm	2144	298	1075	158	212	37	364
Pistol, 7.62 mm	562	257	146	33	64	31	31
Truck, Cargo, 6x6	105		90				15
Truck, Cargo, 4x2	173	157	15	1			
Truck, 1/4T, 6x4	12	7	5				
Truck, Ambulance							
Truck, Radio Van	1			1			
Motorcycle	30			24	2	2	2
Bicycle	24			24			
Cart							
Horse	96			24	12	12	48

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Annex C

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TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT, INFANTRY DIVISION (STANDARD) (AT 100% TOE)

	Total	Cmd Grp & Staff	Chem Co	Sig Bn	Rcn Co	Engr Bn	AT Bn	AA AW Bn	B A N D	Ord Plat	Arty Regt	Tk- A/G Regt	Inf Regts (each)
Personnel:													
Officers	1819	210	9	41	10	39	54	57	1	1	207	134	352
Enlisted	15,766	710	134	283	129	443	364	376	37	37	1290	590	3791
Total	17,585	920	143	324	139	482	418	433	38	38	1497	724	4143
Equipment:													
How, 122-mm	12												
Gun, 76-mm	12										12		
Gun, AT, 57/76-mm	39						12				12		
Gun, AAW, 37/57-mm	12							12					9
Mort, 120-mm	39										12		9
Mort, 82-mm	81												27
Rel Rfl, 57-mm	27												9
Rel Rfl, 75-mm	27												9
AA, 90-mm	54												18
AAMG, 12.7-mm	39									12			9
HMG, 7.62-mm	135												45
LMG, 7.62-mm	378				9	18							117
SMG, 7.62-mm	3499	112	18	18	112	42		77		4	203	156	919
Cbn, 7.62-mm	8717	225	116	213		364		297		33	1075	280	2038
Pistol, 7.62-mm	1867	169	7	36	7	31		45	2	1	146	181	414
Flamethrower	Unk		Unk										
Tank, med	32												
Armd Recon Veh	3											32	
Aslt Gun, SU 76/	12											3	
100												12	
Trk, Cargo, 6x6	382+	6	Unk			15		25			90	12	78
Trk, Cargo, 4x2	107	70						10			15	12	

Annex C

	Total	Cmd Grp & Staff	Chem Co	Sig Bn	Ren Co	Engr Bn	AT Bn	AA AW Bn	B A N D	Ord Plat	Arty Regt	Tk- A/G Regt	Inf Regts (each)
<u>Equipment Cont'd:</u>													
Trk, 1/4T	36	8						1			5	4	6
Trk, Ambulance	4	4											
Motorcycle	25		5	6			2					12	
Bicycle	15			15									
Cart	396+	45											117+
Horse	780+	135		33		45+							189+

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ANNEX D

THE EFFECT OF CLIMATE ON GROUND AND AIR
OPERATIONS IN THE INDIA-BURMA AREA

1. Ground Operations

a. Southwest monsoon. Mid-May through September, is quite warm and humid. Day temperatures are in the 80's (°F.) and 90's, lowering to the 60's and 70's at night, except cooler temperatures are common at higher elevations. Relative humidity averages 80% or more much of the time. Cloudiness ranges 8/10 or more during the morning at most places, with convective clouds in the afternoon and evening covering 7/10 or more of the sky. Precipitation generally averages from 10 to 20 inches per month, with some exposed slopes receiving more than 25 inches. Thunderstorms are common in the spring and the southwest monsoon seasons. Their frequency is determined by local conditions; at some locations thunderstorms occur on 50% of the days in some months. This season would clearly be the most unfavorable one for most military operations.

b. Autumn. Mostly during the month of October, is the transition season from the wet southwest monsoon to the dry northeast monsoon.

c. The northeast monsoon. November to about mid-March, is the dry winter season. Precipitation is at a minimum, averaging less than 2 inches per month at most places. Cloudiness is usually scattered to broken with little diurnal variation. Temperatures are mostly in the 60's and 70's during the day, dropping to 40's and 50's at night; freezing temperatures may occur at higher elevations. Relative humidities are generally high in the morning, averaging 70% or more at most locations and lowering to a minimum during the afternoon and evening. This would be the most favorable season for most military operations.

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d. Spring. Generally from mid-March through mid-May, is the transition from the dry winter to the wet summer. Over much of this sector, temperatures reach a maximum just before the onset of the southwest monsoon, averaging a few degrees warmer than in the summer. Thunderstorms are common with the advance of the southwest monsoon.

2. Air Operations

a. Weather conditions are least favorable for air operations during the southwest monsoon season, when cloudiness and precipitation are at a maximum. Convective-type clouds are predominant with frequent layers of middle and high clouds. Cloudiness is generally most predominant over the southwest slopes and peaks of the mountains. Thunderstorms and showers are frequent in this season. Aircraft icing is most hazardous near 15,000 to 18,000 feet. Flying conditions are generally worse during the 1 or 2 expected tropical storms per season in this region. Winds aloft are mostly southerly, shifting to southeasterly at about 10,000 feet.

b. Weather conditions are generally favorable for air operations during the northeast monsoon season. However, strong westerly winds above 20,000 feet are sometimes present. Aircraft icing may occur at times above 10,000 to 13,000 feet, but is usually not a major problem since cloudiness is at a minimum.

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AIRFIELDS AND AIRCRAFT ORDER OF BATTLE IN TIBET AND SOUTHWEST CHINA

<u>Airfield Name</u>	<u>Distance to Border (NM)</u>	<u>Coords</u>	<u>Elevation ft.</u>	<u>Length ft.</u>	<u>Surface</u>	<u>Estimate of Participating Aircraft</u>		
						<u>Tactical Ftrs</u>	<u>Bombers</u>	<u>Trspts</u>
1. Lhasa	180	30°30'N 91°05'E	14,000 (AMSL)	13,000	Asphalt	60 Mig 15/17s ^{a/}		
2. Nagchhu Dzong	220	31°33'N 91°43'E	15,000 (AMSL)	12,000	Crushed Rock		{20 Tu-2s ^{a/} (25 Il-28s ^{a/}	
3. Yushu	220	32°53'N 96°47'E	12,500 (AMSL)	8,000	Crushed Rock	30 Mig 15/17s ^{a/}		
4. Kantzu	270	31°37'N 100°12'E	11,500 (AMSL)	14,000	Crushed Rock			
5. Chengtu/ Feng-Huang-Shan	360	30°44'N 104°00'E	1,640 (AMSL)	4,600	Macadam			
6. Kuanghan	370	30°57'N 104°20'E	1,640 (AMSL)	8,300	Macadam			
7. Chengtu/Wenchiang	315	30°43'N 103°57'E	1,700 (AMSL)	7,500	Concrete	30 Mig 15/17s ^{b/}	25 Il-28s	{30 Il-12s (28 C-46s (16 Il-14s
8. Chengtu/ Shuangliu	310	30°35'N 103°57'E	1,640 (AMSL)	7,200	Concrete			
9. Chengtu/ Taiping SSU	350	30°16'N 104°01'E	1,640 (AMSL)	5,000	Macadam			
10. Hsinching	340	30°25'N 103°51'E	1,500 (AMSL)	7,000	Macadam			

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Annex E

Airfield Name	Distance to Border (NM)	Coords	Elevation ft.	Length ft.	Surface	Estimate of Participating Aircraft		
						Tactical Ftrs	Bombers	Trspts
11. Hsichang	195	27°55'N 102°13'E	5,000 (AMSL)	4,900	Macadam			
12. Peitun	130	25°27'N 100°44'E	6,420 (AMSL)	6,600	Macadam			
13. Paoshan	65	25°04'N 99°09'E	5,490 (AMSL)	4,900	Macadam			
14. Mangshih	25	24°24'N 98°31'E	3,020 (AMSL)	5,600	Sod			
15. Kunming	230	25°00'N 102°45'E	6,240 (AMSL)	9,500	Concrete	60 Mig 15/17s ^{a/b/}	25 Il-28s ^{a/}	
16. Mengsa	40	23°43'N 99°37'E	4,500 (AMSL)	8,000	Sod			
17. Ssumao North	85	22°47'N 100°57'E	4,120 (AMSL)	6,800	Macadam			
18. Menghsi	10	22°00'N 100°16'E	4,800 (AMSL)	4,300	Sod			
19. Mengtzu West	215	23°24'N 103°19'E	4,720 (AMSL)	8,200	Concrete	30 Mig 15/17s ^{b/}		

^{a/} Order of Battle previously identified in the [REDACTED] Estimate of 17 January 1963 with the exception of Kunming fighters. In the earlier study only 30 Mig 15/17s were estimated to be operating from that location. 30 additional fighters have been added for purposes of this study.

^{b/} Includes 10 Mig 17D aircraft.

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Annex F

AIRFIELDS AND CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRCRAFT ORDER OF BATTLE IN NORTHERN BURMA

<u>Airfield Name</u>	<u>Distance to Indian Border (NM)</u>	<u>Coords</u>	<u>Elevation ft.</u>	<u>Length ft.</u>	<u>Surface and run- way con- dition</u>	<u>Estimate of Participating Aircraft</u>		
						<u>Tactical Ftrs</u>	<u>Bombers</u>	<u>Trspts</u>
1. Putao	15	27°20'N 97°26'E	1,490	6,000	Clay, Fair			
2. Singkaling Hkamti South	30	25°28'N 95°41'E	600	4,200	Gravel, Good			10 AN-2s
3. Namponmao	125	25°21'N 97°17'E	470	6,600	Asphalt, Good	30 Mig 15/17s		
4. Myitkyina South	135	25°22'N 97°21'E	472	6,000	Asphalt, Good	60 Mig 15/17s		
5. Katha	100	24°09'N 96°19'E	320	5,280	Latemite, Good			15 AN-2s
6. Bhamo	140	24°16'N 97°15'E	360	6,060	Asphalt, Poor			
7. Kalembo	40	23°11'N 94°04'E	100	4,200	Latemite, Good			10 AN-2s
8. Mongmit	150	23°06'N 96°39'E	600	5,280	Gravel, Fair			
9. Lashio	210	22°58'N 97°45'E	2,450	4,500	Bitumen, Good			
10. Gangaw	50	22°11'N 94°08'E	700	3,600	Gravel, Fair			

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

25X1X7

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~ - [REDACTED]

Annex F

<u>Airfield Name</u>	<u>Distance to Indian Border (NM)</u>	<u>Coords</u>	<u>Elevation ft.</u>	<u>Length ft.</u>	<u>Surface and run- way con- dition</u>	<u>Estimate of Participating Aircraft</u>		
						<u>Tactical Ftrs</u>	<u>Bombers</u>	<u>Trspts</u>
11. Monywa	115	22°13'N 95°05'E	260	4,900	Gravel, Fair			
12. Mandalay	160	21°56'N 96°05'E	250	4,000	Bitumen, Fair			(7 Li-2s 3 C-47s

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~ - [REDACTED]

AIR LOGISTICS-TACTICAL AIRCRAFT~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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Annex G

<u>Airfields & Aircraft</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>POL & LUB A/C and Rolling Stock</u>	<u>Ammo & Bombs</u>	<u>Tech Supplies</u>	<u>Common Use Items Includes Personnel</u>	<u>Total Short Tons</u>
A. CHINESE AIRFIELDS						
1. <u>LHASA</u>						
60 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Air Defense/ Combat Air Patrol (CAP)	84	8	2	10	104
2. <u>NAGCHHU DZONG</u>						
25 Il-28s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Bomb/Rec	137	40	3	6	186
20 Tu-2s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Ground Support	18	20	2	3	43
TOTAL						333^{a/}
3. <u>YUSHU</u>						
30 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Air Defense/CAP	42	4	1	5	52 ^{b/}

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<u>Airfields & Aircraft</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>POL & LUB A/C and Rolling Stock</u>	<u>Ammo & Bombs</u>	<u>Tech Supplies</u>	<u>Common Use Items Includes Personnel</u>	<u>Total Short Tons</u>
4. <u>CHENG TU/WENCHIANG</u>						
30 Mig 15/17s with Air Techni- cal Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Air Defense/ CAP	42	4	1	5	52
25 IL-28s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Bomb/Rec	137	40	3	6	<u>186</u>
					TOTAL	238 ^{c/}
5. <u>KUNMING</u>						
60 Mig 15/17s with Air Techni- cal Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Air Defense/ CAP	84	8	2	10	104
25 IL-28s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Bomb/Rec	137	40	3	6	<u>186</u>
					TOTAL	290 ^{d/}
6. <u>MENG Tzu WEST</u>						
30 Mig 15/17s with Air Tech- nical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Air Defense/ CAP	42	4	1	5	52 ^{d/}

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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~~SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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Annex G

<u>Airfields & Aircraft</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>POL & LUB A/C and Rolling Stock</u>	<u>Ammo & Bombs</u>	<u>Tech Supplies</u>	<u>Common Use Items Includes Personnel</u>	<u>Total Short Tons</u>
B. <u>BURMESE AIRFIELDS</u>						
1. <u>MYITKYINA</u>						
60 Mig 15/17s with Air Tech- nical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Ground At- tack, Air Defense, CAP	84	8	2	10	104
2. <u>NAMPONMAO</u>						
30 Mig 15/17s with Air Tech- nical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Ground At- tack, Air Defense, CAP	42	4	1	5	<u>52</u>
					TOTAL	156^{e/}

25X1X7

- a/ This tonnage provided as indicated in para. 25 to ~~SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~ Estimate dated 17 January 1963.
- b/ This tonnage provided by truck from Hsining-Lanchou railhead. It is not a restrictive factor in this problem.
- c/ This tonnage is not a restrictive factor due to proximity of major railhead.
- d/ At least 400 short tons per day are required and available to support air operations out of total tonnage delivered daily to Kunming by rail and roadway.
- e/ All logistic support to Myitkyina and Namponmao must be air transported. Approximately 132 tons are delivered daily by 13th Air Division transports from the major railhead adjacent to the Chengtu airfield complex. In addition, 10 transports based at Mandalay are capable of delivering approximately 32 tons per day to Myitkyina and Namponmao or to AN-2s at Singkaling Hkamti South, Katha, or Kalembo. Additional tonnage is also considered available to support fighter operations at Myitkyina and Namponmao, inasmuch as transports probably would be able to operate about 25% more flying days than would the fighter aircraft they support.

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Revision (21 May 1963)

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Annex G

Airfields & Aircraft	Mission	POL & LUB A/C and Rolling Stock	Ammo & Bombs	Tech Supplies	Common Use Items Includes Personnel	Total Short Tons
B. BURMESE AIRFIELDS						
1. MYITKYINA ^{Se}						
60 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Ground Attack, Air Defense, CAP	64	20	2	10	96
2. NAMPONMAO						
30 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Ground Attack, Air Defense, CAP	36(14) ^{e/}	7(2) ^{e/}	1(5) ^{e/}	5(3) ^{e/}	49(19.5) ^{e/}
					<u>TOTAL</u>	145 ^{f/}

25X1X7

- a/ This tonnage provided as indicated in para 25 to ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~ Estimate dated 17 January 1963.
- b/ This tonnage provided by truck from Hsining-Lanchou railhead. It is not a restrictive factor in this problem.
- c/ This tonnage is not a restrictive factor due to proximity of major railhead.
- d/ At least 400 short tons per day are required and available to support air operations out of total tonnage deliverable daily to Kunming by rail and roadway.
- e/ Figures in parentheses indicate Mig-17D requirements. They are parts of rather than additions to the totals. This breakout included here to distinguish Mig-17D air defense mission from primary ground attack mission of remaining 20 jet fighters.
- f/ With the exception of the first 6-8 days of operations or during the rainy season when certain road systems may be temporarily inoperable, this tonnage will be provided overland by truck. During periods when air supply is necessary, it will be accomplished largely by Thirteenth Air Division aircraft operating from the Chengtu airfield complex. Approximately 132 tons could be delivered daily from this railhead location using 30 Il-12s, 16 Il-14s and 28 C-46s on a 50% serviceability basis. In addition, 7 Li-2s and 3 C-47s, operating first from Kunming and then Mandalay, could easily supply the remaining 13 tons. Another factor favoring adequate tonnage at these two fields is that transports probably would be able to operate about 25% more flying days than the fighter aircraft they were supporting.

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